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COVENANTS RUNNING WITH LAND IN NEW
JERSEY
ALBERT S. BOLLES
If there has been a somewhat meagre development of legal
principles that apply to covenants running with land in New
Jersey, no one will question the fullness of the equitable principles
that have been wrought and applied to them by the courts of
equity.
It has been said that the office and operation of the usual
covenants for title are personal, binding the representatives of
the covenantor, and that they are not real covenants in the sense
of the ancient feudal law. This is especially true of three of
them: that the grantor is lawfully seised of the premises; that
he has a good right to convey them; and that they are free from
encumbrances. They do not run with the land nor pass the title
to the assignee. They are in language de presenti, and, if not true,
are broken as soon as they are made. The two remaining cove-
nants-that the grantee shall enjoy the premises, and that the
grantor will warrant and defend the title-are prospective, and
are therefore real covenants which run with the land conveyed, and
descend to heirs and assignees.' A warranty attaches only to
the estate granted, or purported to be granted. Thus a warranty
attached to a life estate cannot enlarge the estate which was
granted, even though it warrant the land to the life tenant and his
heirs general.
2
This division of covenants prevails in most of the states.
The covenants of warranty and quiet enjoyment, which are some-
times regarded as a single covenant, in all jurisdictions are held
to run with the land. On the other hand, only in a few states
does the covenant of seisin run with the land. 3 There is, how-
'Carter v. Denman, 23 N. J. L. 260 (1852); Chapman v. Holmes, io N. J.
L. 20 (1828) ; see Lot v. Thomas, 2 N. J. L. 297, 299 (18o5) ; Garrison v. Sand-
ford, 12 N. J. L. 261, 264 (1831).
'Adams v. Ross, 3o N. J. L. 5o5 (i86o).
'Schofield v. Iowa Homestead Co., 32 Iowa 317 (1871); Martin v. Baker,
5 Blackf. 232 (Ind. 1839); Coleman v. Lyman, 42 Ind. 289 (1873) ; Backus v.
McCoy, 3 Ohio 211 (1827); Great Western Stock Co. v. Saas, 24 Ohio St. 542
(1874).
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ever, a wide conflict with respect to what constitutes a breach
of the covenant of seisin.4  There is a growing tendency to re-
gard the covenant against encumbrances as running with the
land.5 In New York, after many varying decisions, the Court
of Appeals has declared that: "The covenant against encum-
brances attaches to and runs with the land and passes to a remote
grantee through the line of conveyances, whether there is a nom-
inal breach or not when the deed is delivered." 6 In this tendency
the American courts are conforming to the English rule.7
This rule has been applied to deeds of lots which abutted
on a road ending in a cul-de-sac and described "as laid out across
the whole tract," and containing a covenant by which the grantors
bound themselves and their heirs and assigns not to erect on the
remaining property owned by them, adjoining the property con-
veyed, any house costing less than a specified amount or nearer
than forty feet to the street line. This covenant was held to be
personal to the grantees, and did not extend to the benefit of sub-
sequent purchasers of other lots.' To this illustration may be
added another of a personal covenant, in which damages were
not to be claimed for the future use of land by a railroad. In a
deed from A to C the latter covenanted for himself, his heirs
and assigns, that neither he nor they would claim any damages
for injury to the land conveyed from the construction of a rail-
road that was to be built on A's adjoining land. The court held
that the railroad company could not avail itself of the covenant
in that deed because it was not a grant of an easement, nor of a
right in the nature of an easement, in the premises conveyed, and
'Mitchell v. Hazen, 4 Conn. 495 (1823); Brady v. Spurck, 27 Ill. 478
(1861) ; Wilson v. Widenham, 5i Me. 566 (1863) ; Marston v. Hobbs, 2 Mass.
433 (i8o7) ; Stewart v. Drake, 9 N. J. L. 139 (1827) ; Backus v. McCoy, m.pra
note 3.
'Richard v. Brent, 59 Ill. 38 (1871) ; Worley v. Hineman, 6 Ind. App. 240,
33 N. E. 26o (1892) ; Beasley v. Phillips, 2o Ind. App. 182, So N. E. 488 (1897);
Knadler v. Sharp, 36 Iowa 232 (1873) ; Allen v. Little, 36 Me. 170 (1853);
Security Bank v. Holmes, 68 Minn. 538, 71 N. W. 699 (1897) ; Stiles v. Hobbs,
2 Disn. 571 (Ohio 1856) ; Cole v. Kimball, 52 Vt. 639 (1880) ; see Foote v.
Burnet, io Ohio 317, 332 (1840).
" Geiszler v. DeGraaf, 166 N. Y. 339, 344, 59 N. E. 993, 995 (i9ox).
744 & 45 VIC'r., c. 4I, §7 (1881); Kingdon v. Nottle, 4 Maule & S. 53
(1815) ; Spoor v. Green, L. R. 9 Ex. 99 (1874).
' Stevens v. Headley, 69 N. J. Eq. 533, 62 AtI. 887 (19o5).
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that the burden of such a covenant, if regarded as a covenant,
would not in law run with the land nor bind the alienee in any
case except that of landlord and tenant. The covenant in the
deed was construed as one inter partes, with A individually, for
his personal indemnity. In another case a tunnel company cove-
nanted with a railroad company that it would not institute con-
demnation proceedings under any specified land belonging to the
railroad company. The covenant was held not to run with the
land, and therefore it was not binding on the successor of the
tunnel company.' 0 A covenant by a mortgagor to insure the
mortgaged land for the benefit of the mortgagee is a personal
covenant not running with the land."
A covenant for the maintenance of a railroad crossing will
run with the land and will enure to the benefit of the heirs of
the grantor. Once located, the crossing cannot be changed save
by mutual consent; nor will the court give something as a substi-
tute unless the railroad can show that, under the special conditions
of the case, the enforcement of the legal right would be inequi-
table.' 2  Compensation, however, in a proper case may be awarded
for not executing a covenant.' 3 Cases concerning party walls,
which involve problems of covenants running with land, have
been the sources of much litigation in New York, Illinois, Mas-
sachusetts and Pennsylvania, and, to a lesser degree, in other
states. The few cases which have reached the higher courts in
New Jersey have involved mainly questions of statutory construc-
tion. In Hunt v. Amnbruster 14 the rule was announced that the
right to compensation passes with the ownership of the building.
This rule was established by an ordinance of the city of Camden,
9 Costigan v. Penna. R. R., 54 N. J. L. 233, 23 Ati. 8io (1892).
" Morris & Essex R. R. v. Hoboken & M. R. R., 68 N. J. Eq. 328, 59 Ad.
332 (904).
.Kaplan v Wilderman, 95 N. J. Eq. 463, 123 At. i65 (1924).
"Moorhead v. Little Miami R. R., 17 Qhio 340 (1848); Speer v. Erie R.
R., 64 N. J. Eq. 6oi, 54 At. 539 (93) ; Blakemore v. Glamorganshire Canal
Co., i Mylne & K. i54 (Eng. 1832); see Morris & Essex R. R. v. Central R. R.
of N. J., 31 N. J. L. 2o5, 209 (i865).
" Sperb v. Metropolitan Elevated Ry., 137 N. Y. 155, 32 N. E. io5o (1893);
New York City v. Pine, i85 U. S. 93, 22 Sup. Ct. 592 (i9o2) ; see note (t893)
2o L. R. A. 752.
iV N. J. Eq. 208 (1865).
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which coincided not only with the general rule, but also with the
statutes of many states.
Whether a covenant is of a proper nature to run with the
land is a pure question of law, to be decided by the court. The
question is not one of the intention of the covenanting parties,
regardless of their lawful inclination. Accordingly, ever since
Lord Brougham's day, the courts have reiterated his well known
declaration that covenantors are not free to invent any covenants
that their imagination or caprice may contrive 15-a rule approved
by the courts in this state. Thus in Brewer v. Marshall': a cove-
nant by a grantor of land, that neither he nor his assigns would
sell any marl from the premises adjoining the land sold, could not
be enforced against an alienee whom the grantor sought to bur-
den with the covenant. Said Chief Justice Beasley:
.. . the covenant in question appears to be destitute
of all the essentials of a legal agreement . . . I cannot say
that the covenant is legal, anymore than I can say that a
covenant on the part of a farmer not to sell, nor permit any
of the future owners of his farm to sell, any grain to be grown
on his farm, would be legal." 17
Another question, in the process of settlement in other juris-
dictions, has long been settled in New Jersey. A deed poll, ac-
cepted by the proper parties, is regarded as a covenant, as much
so as if signed and sealed by both of them.' 8 While in some
states the distinction between sealed and unsealed instruments
has been abolished by statute, 19 other states still maintain the
Keppell v. Bailey, 2 Myl. & K. 57 (Eng. 1834). But see Luker & Den-
nis, 7 Ch. Div. 227, 236 (1876).16 9 N. J. Eq. 537, afro i8 N. J. Eq. 337 (I868) ; see Natl Union Bank v.
Segur, 39 N. 3. L. i73, 184 (1877).
'7 Supra note i6, at 547.
Finley v. Simpson, 22 N. J. L. 311 (i85o) ; Hagerty v. Lee, 54 N. J. L.
580, 25 AtI. 319 (1892) ; McNichol v. Townsend, 73 N. J. Eq. 276, 67 Atl. 938
(i9o7), aff'd, 74 N. J. Eq. 618, 7o Atl. 965 (ipo8) ; Brigham v. Mulock Co., 74
N. J. Eq. 287, 70 AtI. i85 (igo8) ; Newbery v. Barkalow, 75 N. J. Eq. 128, 71
Ati. 752 (i9o8).
Deyer v. Gill, 32 Ark. 410 (I877) ; Ortman v. Dixon, 13 Cal. -33 (1859);
Edwards v. Dillon, 147 Ill. 14, 35 N. E. 135 (1893); Williams v. Haines, 27
Iowa 251 (1869) ; Gibbs v. McGuire, 70 Miss. 646, 12 So. 829 (i893) ; Landauer
v. Sioux Falls Imp. Co., io S. D. 205, 72 N. W. 467 (i897) ; Garrett v. Belmont
Land Co., 94 Tenn. 459, 29 S. W. 726 (i894) ; Murray v. Beal, 23 Utah 548, 65
Pac. 726 (igoi).
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ancient rule.20  In the former group of states, no question of
the common law liability of a grantee under a deed poll as a cove-
nantor can arise. His liability is in an action of debt or assump-
sit, or an implied covenant. In New Jersey, the grantee of a
deed, by accepting it, becomes liable on the covenants therein
purporting to be made by him, as if he had signed and sealed
the instrument..2 1  Hence a covenant by the grantee to assume
a mortgage, for the payment of which the grantor is personally
responsible, binds the grantee to pay the mortgage debt.22  The
damages that may be recovered by the grantor are the full amount
of the debt, even though he has not yet paid it.23
A covenant need not have the precision of form required
in former days. Any words that clearly express the intention of
the covenantors will be sufficient.24  A covenant that the grantor
"will warrant and forever defend the premises against all law-
ful claims freed and discharged of all encumbrances", is not only
a covenant against encumbrances, but is also a general warranty. 25
Likewise the purpose of a grantor, with whom a restrictive cove-
nant is made, can be evidenced by the language in the covenant
itself, or by other language in the deed.26 The importance of the
use or omission of the word assigns still lingers in some judicial
minds. The confusing, if not contradictory, resolutions in Spen-
'Hinsdale v. Humphrey, 15 Conn. 431 (1843) ; Dawson v. Western Md.
R. R., 1o7 Md. 70, 68 At. 3oi (907) ; Parish v. Whitney, 69 Mass. 516 (1855).
Contra: Atlanta, K. & N. Ry. v. McKinney, 124 Ga. 929, 53 S. E. 701 (9o6);
Sexauer v. Wilson, 136 Iowa 357, 113 N. W. 941 (9o7) ; Poage v. Wabash, St.
L. & P. Ry., 24 Mo. App. 1g (1887); Burbank v. Pillsbury, 48 N. H. 475
(1869) ; Atlantic Dock Co. v. Leavitt, 54 N. Y. 35 (1873) ; Bowen v. Beck, 94N. Y. 86 (1883) ; Blood v. Crew-Levick Co., 177 Pa. 6o6, 35 Atl. 871 (1896);
Beedy v. Nypano R. R., 250 Pa. SI, 95 At. 343 (1915).
Sparkman v. Gove, 44 N. J. L. 252 (1882).
"Ibid.
Ibid.2
4 Davis v. Lyman, 6 Conn. 249, 252 (1826) ; Kettle River R. R. v. Eastern
Ry., 41 Minn. 461, 471, 43 N. W. 469, 473 (1889) ; Langdon v. Mayor of New
York, 93 N. Y. 129, 150 (1883) ; Masury v. Southworth, 9 Ohio St. 340, 348
(18s9).
= Carter v. Denman, supra note i.
Hemsley v. Marlborough Hotel Co., 62 N. J. Eq. 164, 50 At. 14 (I9oi),
GF'd, 63 N. J. Eq. 804, 52 Atl. 1130 (1902); Rogers v. Hosegood, [19oo] 2 Ch.
388.
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cer's Case 27 have darkened rather than lightened the path of in-
quiry. The modern decisions are far less confusing. If a covenant
does not touch or concern the land, but is merely collateral, it is
personal, 28 even though the covenanting parties have clearly ex-
pressed their intention that the covenant should run with the
land.2 9 On the other hand, if the covenant does touch or concern
the land, whether or not it pertains to a thing in esse, the use of
the word assigns is not essential for the covenant to run with
the land.a° Its omission is simply evidence of the intention of
the covenantors, but is not decisive. 31 A covenant in which a
lessor covenants with the lessee, without mentioning the lessee's
assigns, to pay for the value of substituted machinery at the end
of the term, enures to the benefit of the assignee of the tenant.
Such improvements are a lien on the premises, which equity will
enforce.32
If it be doubtful whether a clause in a deed is intended as
a covenant or as a condition, the clause should be construed as
a covenant, for the legal consequences of a broken condition are
much greater than those of a broken covenant. 3  In like manner,
words in a deed, not in the form either of a covenant or a con-
dition, will be construed as a covenant rather than as a condi-
tion.
3 4
Since the covenant runs with the land, it is immaterial
whether it pass by a deed from the grantor or from a judicial
officer properly authorized to convey it. By statute a sheriff's
deed passes all the interest of the mortgagor at the date of the
mortgage, or, if made under a judgment at law, the deed passes
'5 Coke 16 (Eng. 1582).
'Berry v. VanWinkle, 2 N. J. Eq. 269 (839) ; Conover v. Smith, 17 N. J.
Eq. 51 (1864).29 Ibid.
' 9Woodruff v. Trenton Water Power Co., io N. J. Eq. 489 (1856); see
Winfield v. Henning, 21 N. J. Eq. 188, 189 (i87o); Note (1967) 14 L. R. A.
(N. s.) 185.
"See Brown v. Southern Pac. Ry., 36 Ore. 128, 135, 58 Pac. 1104, 11o7
(1899).
Copper v. Wells, i N. 3. Eq. Io (183o) ; Conover v. Smith, supra note 28.
' 9Woodruff v. Woodruff, 44 N. 3. Eq. 349, 16 Ati. 4 (1888).
'4 Ibid.
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all his interest at the time of its rendition. 3  He is as much the
assignee of the covenant as though the conveyance was made by
the covenantee himself.
36
Moreover, an assignee who is evicted may maintain a per-
sonal action of covenant against the executors of the grantor.3 7
He need not aver that notice of the pendency of the suit, which
effected the plaintiff's eviction, was given to the defendant ;3s nor
need he be described as assignee.39  The declaration must, of
course, describe the land with convenient certainty.
While the courts must determine, as a matter of law,
whether a covenant does touch and concern the land, they regard
with more favor than formerly the interpretation put by cove-
nantors on their engagements. Chief Justice Beasley said:
while it is plain that a mere personal covenant can-
not, by the agreement of parties, have its nature so altered
as to make it transmissible with land, nevertheless when the
question is whether the given covenant does concern certain
premises, the fact that such parties considered it to have
such quality, should be potent in a decision of the inquiry." 40
The covenant by the vendor in this case, attached to a deed of
land and a bank building thereon, was that he would not engage in
the business of banking in that locality. This was regarded as a
benefit to the estate conveyed and ran with the land.
After a breach of the covenant of warranty it no longer runs
with the land, but becomes a mere chose in action. By the an-
cient law this was not assignable,4 but it is now by statute.42
If the land is sold after a breach of the covenant, the right of
action does not pass to the purchaser; it still belongs to the owner
Carter v. Denman, supra note i.
'Carter v. Denman, supra note I, at 272; McCrady v. Brisbane, i Nott &
McC. 104 (S. C. 1818).
Chapman v. Holmes, supra note i.
Ibid.
Carter v. Denman, supra note i.
' Nat'!l Union Bank v. Segur, supra note 16, at 187.
DeLong v. Spring Lake Imp. Co., 74 N. J. L. 25o, 66 Atl. 591 (19o7)..
' N. J. Comp. STAT. (igxo) p. 1965, §38.
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at the time the breach occurred.43  The right of action does not
arise unless there has been either eviction by title paramount or
action brought ;44 nor does the mere existence of a right to re-
cover nominal damages on a covenant against encumbrances pre-
vent a recovery of substantial damages on a covenant of warranty
after a subsequent eviction. 5 While a cause of action for breach
of a covenant against encumbrance is separate and distinct from a
cause of action for a breach of warranty, the two covenants may
be in the same instrument.4 ' Again, though a deed is inter partes,
a covenant therein made with a third person may be enforced
by him if it clearly appears that it is the intention of the parties
to confer this right ;47 formerly this right was denied him.
48
Before considering the relief afforded by courts of equity to
parties who have entered into covenants running with land, some
discussion of the principles of implied covenants is necessary. If
land conveyed is located by a highway, in equity there is an im-
plied covenant that the land in the highway, subject to the public
easement, is appurtenant to that specified in the deed of convey-
ance. This conception of an implied covenant has been fully
set forth by Vice-Chancellor Van Fleet, in Coudert v. Sayre:
. ..when it appears by the true construction of the
terms of a grant that it was the well-understood purpose
of the parties to create or reserve a right, in the nature of a
servitude or easement, in the property granted, for the benefit
of other land owned by the grantor, no matter in what form
such purpose may be expressed-such right, if not against
public policy, will be held to be appurtenant to the land of
the grantor, and binding on that conveyed to the
grantee . . . " 49
,DeLong v. Spring Lake Imp. Co., supra note 41.
"Carter v. Denman, supra note i.
'Smith v. Wahl, 88 N. J. L. 623, 97 At. 261 (i9i5). But cf. Leggett v.
Lippincott, 5o N. J. L. 462, 14 Atl. 577 (1888).
,6 Smith v. Wahl, supra note 45.
, TNat'I Union Bank v. Segur, supra note 16.
Smith v. Emery, 12 N. J. L. 53 (1830).
'p46 N. J. Eq. 386, 395, i9 At. 19o, 193 (i89o) ; cf. Kirkpatrick v. Peshine,
24 N. J. Eq. 2o6 (1873); Hayes v. Waverly & P. R. R., 51 N. J. Eq. 345, 27
Ad. 648 (1893) ; Bowen v. Smith, 76 N. J. Eq. 456, 74 Ad. 675 (igog) ; Brewer
v. Marshall, supra note 16.
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The right and burden thus created pass with the land to all sub-
sequent grantees, and every grantee of land to which such right
is appurtenant is entitled in equity to protection, "notwithstanding
that his right may not rest on a covenant which, as a matter of
law runs with the title to his land . . . "50
Equity extends its protecting wings in another direction.
Even though a covenant may not run with the land, or an ease-
ment relation may not exist, equity will compel the performance
of a covenant known to the party who in justice ought to perform
it.51 After reviewing several decisions in which relief was
granted, Chief Justice Beasley, in Brewer v. Marshalli2 remarked
that the courts proceed on the principle of preventing a party hav-
ing knowledge of the rights of another from defeating them.
Consequently: ". . . a court of equity will sometimes impose
the burden of a covenant relating to lands on the alienee of such
lands on a principle altogether aside from the existence of an
easement or the capacity of such covenant to adhere to the title." 53
A still more important application of this principle occurs in
the many cases involving land improvement schemes. 54  The most
general principle applied to them was formulated, in the familiar
Monmouth Beach case, by Vice-Chancellor Green:
' Coudert v. Sayre, suitra note 49, at 395, i9 AtI. at 194.
'Whitney v. Union Ry., 77 Mass. 359 (1858); Parker v. Nightingale, 88
Mass. 341 (1863) ; Kettle River R. R. v. Eastern R. R., supra note 24; Brewer
v. Marshall, supra note I6; Columbia College v. Lynch, 7o N. Y. 440 (1877) ;
Hodge v. Sloan, 1o7 N. Y. 244, 17 N. E. 335 (1887); Horn v. Miller, 136 Pa.
64o, 2o Atl. 7o6 (i89o) ; Bald Eagle Valley R. R. v. Nittany Valley R. R., 171
Pa. 284, 33 Atl. 239 (1895) ; Middletown v. Newport Hospital, I6 R. 1. 319, 15
Atl. 8oo (1888).
Supra note 16, at 544.
Brewer v. Marshall, supra note i6, at 544; Holsman v. Boiling Spring
Bleaching Co., 14 N. J. Eq. 335 (1862) ; Van Doren v. Robinson, i6 N. J. Eq.
256 (1863) ; Kirkpatrick v. Peshine, mupra note 49; Franklin v. Creth, 97 N. J.
Eq. 538, 128 At. 268 (1925); Tulk v. Moxhay, 2 Phill. 774 (Eng. 1848); cf.
Leaver v. Gorman, 73 N. J. Eq. 129, 67 Atl. iii (i9o7); Hyman v. Tash, 71
At. 742 (N. J. Eq. i9og).
"Winfield v. Henning, supra note 30; Mulligan v. Jordan, 5o N. J. Eq. 363,
24 At. 543 (i892) ; Hayes v. Waverly & P. R. R., supra note 49; Trout v.
Lucas, 54 N. J. Eq. 361, 35 Atl. 153 (1896); Morrow v. Hasselman, 69 N. J.
Eq. 612, 6i Ati. 369 (1905) ; Barton v. Slifer, 72 N. J. Eq. 812, 66 Adt. 899
(i9o7) ; McNichol v. Townsend, supra note 18; Leaver v. Gorman, supra note
53; Newbery v. Barkalow, supra note 18; Bowen v. Smith, supra note 49; Miller
v. Jersey Coast Resorts Corp., 98 N. J. Eq. 289, 13o Ati. 824 (1925) ; see Polhe-
iuns v. DeLisle, 98 N. J. Eq. 256, 262, 13o At. 618, 621 (1925).
36 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
" . a court of equity will restrain the violation of a cov-
enant, entered into by a grantee, restrictive of the use of
lands conveyed, not only against the covenantor but against
all subsequent purchasers of the land with notice of the
covenant, irrespective of the questions whether the covenant
is of a nature to run with the land or whether it creates an
easement; provided, however, that its enforcement is not
against public policy." 55
"Restrictions of this character", said Chief Justice De-
pue, "are valid, and are regarded as for the benefit of the
owners of the tract to be improved and made profitable by
sales of lots, and also for the advantage of persons who have
become purchasers on the faith of the scheme of improve-
m ent . , 56
In applying this principle, therefore, the right of the owner
of a lot to enforce a restrictive covenant, on the use of another
lot, entered into between former owners, depends primarily on
whether the covenant was made for the benefit of the land
embraced in the owner's lot. While this can be done in equity,
in law the purchaser of one of such lots from the grantee could
not enforce the covenant against the purchaser of another of
them.5 7  The common scheme, to be effective in equity, must be
strictly preserved. 58 It must be universal and reciprocal. The
same restrictions must be imposed upon all lots similarly situated.
If they are not alike, or some lots are not subject to restrictions,
while others are, the scheme fails.
"It is only when there is a general plan imposed upon the
lands sold, under which each purchaser buys, that a prior
purchaser may enforce the restriction against a subsequent
purchaser who violates it." 59
DeGray v. Monmouth Beach Club House Co., 5o N. J. Eq. 329, 332, 24
At]. 388, 389 (1892); cf. Spicer v. Martin, 14 App. Cas. i2 (i889); Elliston v.
Reacher, [1908] 2 Ch. 374, aff'd, ibid., 665; see Renals v. Cowlishaw, 9 Ch. D.
125, i28, aff'd, ii Ch. D. 866 (i879).
Walker v. Renner, 6o N. J. Eq. 493, 498, 46 Atl. 626, 626 (igoo).
s See Winfield v. Henning, supra note 3o, at I9O.
SZelman v. Kaufherr, 76 N. J. Eq. 52, 73 Atl. 1048 (i9o9); Peek v.
Matthews, L. R. 3 Eq. Cas. 515 (i867).
' Ocean City Ass'n v. Headley, 62 N. J. Eq. 322, 336, 5o At. 78, 83 (1901);
cf. Mulligan v. Jordan, supra. note 54; Ryall v. Saxe, 97 N. J. Eq. 393, 129
Atl. 433 (1925) ; Klein v. Sisters of Charity, 139 At]. 174 (N. J. Eq. 1927).
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A covenant or agreement restricting the use of land in favor
of other lands creates an easement that makes one of the lands
subservient and the other dominant.
"All that is necessary", says Chief Justice Gummere,
"to create such an easement is a clear manifestation of the
intention of the person who is the source of title to subject
one parcel of land to a restriction in its use for the benefit of
another, and efficient language to make that restriction per-
petual." 60
Again, a covenant prescribing the mode of improving land,
and restraining the use of it, does not violate any rule of law
when the restriction is reasonable, and the party in whose favor
it is made, or those in privity with him, is interested in the subject
matter of the restriction.6' A restriction may therefore be ap-
plied to land used and operated as an elevated railroad.62
Moreover, if, in a general land improvement scheme, some
of the lots are set apart for specified purposes, such as parks, which
are regarded as an advantage to all purchasers of lots, there is an
implied covenant with them that such lots shall retain their special
character.6 3  Each purchaser of a lot, or his grantees, may en-
force the easement against the grantor, or his grantees who pur-
chased with notice of the implied covenant.64  He may also en-
force it against the donee of the covenantor who accepts as a gift
a conveyance of part of the land charged with the covenant. On
the other hand, one who divides his land into lots and streets as
shown by a public map, if no neighborhood scheme exists calling
Restrictions in the conveyance must be incorporated by the common grantor in
every deed to the lots sold under the general scheme. Ferraro v. Zozlowski, 138Atl. 197 (N. J. Eq. z927).
"Propper v. Colson, 86 N. J. Eq. 399, 401, 99 At. 385, 386 (1916).
See Grigg v. Landis, 21 N. J. Eq. 494, 502 (187o).
Hayes v. Waverly & P. R. R., supra note 49.
"Lennig v. Ocean City Ass'n, 41 N. J. Eq. 6o6, 7 At. 491 (1886) ; Bridge-
water v. Ocean City R. R., 62 N. J. Eq. 276, 49 Atl. 8oi, aff'd, 63 N. J. Eq. 798,
52 Atl. 1130 (19o2).
"Ibid.
Bridgewater v. Ocean City R. R., supra note 63.
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for the erection of one building only on a lot, does not impliedly
covenant that he will not subdivide the lots into smaller parcels. 66
Finally, restrictions in a general land improvement scheme
may in equity be imposed on lands beyond the express restrictions
contained in deeds to purchasers, on the theory of an implied
covenant.6 7
By way of further defining the rights of covenanting par-
ties, in a plan forming a general land scheme, Vice-Chancellor
Grey has remarked that:
"The parties who may enforce such restrictive cove-
nants are the original grantors with whom they were made,
and all subsequent purchasers of the lands to be benefited
by them. The parties against whom they may be enforced
are the grantees who accept deeds containing the restrictions,
and all those who subsequently purchase the restricted lands
with notice of the covenant." 68
Consequently if an owner sells a portion of his land with a cove-
nant restricting its use, a subsequent grantee of another portion
from the same owner may enforce the covenant against the orig-
inal grantee and against all subsequent purchasers with notice
from him.69 On the other hand, a prior purchaser from the orig-
inal owner cannot enforce a restriction imposed by the latter upon
a lot subsequently conveyed, unless in the prior deed there was
a grant of a right in the residue of the land retained by the ven-
dor; 70 or a stipulation that the restrictions put upon the lot sold
by the prior deed should also be imposed upon the remaining
property when making sales to subsequent purchasers, or in some
other way indicating that all the lots sold are parts of a uniform
I Farquharson v. Scoble, 38 Cal. App. 68o, 177 Pac. 31o (i918) ; Utujian v.
Boldt, 242 Mich. 331, 218 N. W. 692, 57 A. L. R. 761 (1928) ; Stoever v. Gowen,
28o Pa. 424, x24 Atl. 684 (1924) ; Herold v. Columbia Investment Co., 72 N. J.
Eq. 857, 67 Ati. 6o7 (19o7) ; cf. Schickhaus v. Sanford, 83 N. J. Eq. 454, 91 At.
878 (1914).
' Shickhaus v. Sanford, supra note 66; Lennig v. Ocean City Ass'n, supra
note 63; Herold v. Columbia Investment Co., supra note 66; Talmadge v. East
River Bank, 26 N. Y. l05 (1862).
Roberts v. Scull, 58 N. J. Eq. 396, 401, 43 At. 583, 585 (1899).
Ibid.
10 Ibid.
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scheme. 71 Again, a grantee, whose deed is subsequent to the im-
position of a restrictive covenant on land of the grantor, can en-
force the covenant against a prior grantee of another lot, but a
prior grantee can only enforce it where the purpose of the cove-
nant is to carry out a general plan or scheme for the development
of all the original grantor's property.
72
The right to enforce a restriction in a deed, made for the bene-
fit of the vendor's remaining land, passes to a subsequent grantee
of the vendor.73 But if a deed containing a restrictive covenant
is made subsequent to a deed of other property owned by the same
vendor, the grantee in the prior deed does not take the land with
the benefit of such restrictive covenant.r 4
"There can be little, if any, difference in principle", says
Vice-Chancellor Learning, "between a restrictive covenant
made by a vendee for the benefit of remaining land of his
vendor, and one made by a vendor touching his remaining
land for the benefit of his vendee. Both are held to be en-
forceable by a purchaser of the land, for the benefit of which
the covenant has been made, against a purchaser of the re-
stricted land who is chargeable with notice of the cov-
enant." 75
Furthermore, if in a land improvement scheme, a mortgage
is created containing the covenant that, after part payment, a part
of the land mortgaged may be released, the benefits of the cove-
nant should be regarded as running with the land and passing
with it to a grantee of the mortgagor, even though it is not spe-
cifically stated that the covenant is for the benefit of the assigns of
the mortgagor.
7 6
The original grantor, in imposing a covenant upon the gran-
tee, may or may not bind himself. If he does not, the grantee,
having no right of action against him, cannot pursue any other
7'Ibid.
7" Ibid.
Hemsley v. Marlborough Hotel Co., supra note 26.
'Ibid.
Wootton v. Seltzer, 83 N. J. Eq. 163, 167, go Atl. 701, 703 (1914).
71 Ventnor Investment Co. v. Record Development Co., 79 N. J. Eq. io3, 8o
Ati. 952 (IgII).
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grantee to whom the grantor may convey the whole, or a part, of
the remaining land. Again, after a deed has been made, the
grantee cannot get the benefit of restrictions which the grantor
has seen fit to insert in subsequent conveyances. 77
A covenant restricting the lawful use of land by the owner
must be strictly construed; "I doubtful restrictions will not be en-
forced.7 9 They must be clear and unambiguous; 80 otherwise the
courts will refuse to enforce them.8 An exception, limiting the
scope and effect of a restrictive covenant, should have a liberal
construction. 2  An exception may in some instances have the
practical effect of enlarging, by explaining, an otherwise ambigu-
ous restrictive covenant, or one of doubtful meaning. Its ordi-
nary province is to limit or detract from, rather than to enlarge,
the scope of the covenant to which it is attached.s Of course, an
injunction will not be granted if no restrictive covenant exists. 84
A common grantor, who has parted with the title to a portion
of his land, for the benefit of which a restrictive covenant had
been imposed on other land previously conveyed by him, cannot
thereafter release or modify the covenant, to the injury of the
grantee of the benefited property.8 5 In other words, a grantor's
release of a restrictive covenant does not preclude other parties,
to whom he had conveyed lots, from enforcing their rights against
any purchaser violating the restriction."
SSeidel v. Mills, 84 N. J. Eq. 285, 96 At. 899 (I915).
Fortesque v. Carroll, 76 N. J. Eq. 583, 75 At!. 923 (igio) ; Howland v.
Andrus, 81 N. J. Eq. 175, 86 Atl. 391 (1912) ; Ronan v. Barr, 82 N. J. Eq. 563,
89 Atl. 282 (1913) ; Jones v. Mulligan, 21 At!. 6o8 (N. J. Eq. I923) ; Trainer
v. Calef, 96 N. J. Eq. 657, i26 At!. 3oi (1924).
'McNichol v. Townsend, supra note 18; see Catoggio v. Rehm, 83 N. J.
Eq. 327, 329, go At. 1047, 1048 (1914).
' Goater v. Ely, 8o N. J. Eq. 40, 82 At!. 611 (912) ; Meaney v. Stork, 8o
N. J. Eq. 60, 83 At. 492 (1912) ; Holman v. Parker, 94 N. J. Eq. 41, 118 At. 334
(1922) ; Tsangas v. Broogos, 95 N. J. Eq. 499, 123 At. 247 (924).
' Camovito v. Matthews, 82 N. J. Eq. 218, 88 At. 187 (1913) ; Underwood
v. Herman & Co., 82 N. J. Eq. 353, 89 At. 21 (913).
' Trainer v. Calef, supra note 78.
'Thomas v. Hillman, IOO N. J. Eq. 328, 134 At. 655 (926).
Beattie v. Howell, 98 N. J. Eq. 163, 129 At. 822 (I925).
"Bowen v. Smith, supra note 49; Coudert v. Sayre, supra note 49.
8'Henderson v. Champion, 83 N. J. Eq. 554, 91 At!. 332 (i914); Muller v.
Weiss, g N. J. Eq. 29, io8 At!. 768, aff'd, 91 N. J. Eq. 32r, 1o9 At. 357 (919);
Wootton v. Seltzer, supra note 75.
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A restrictive covenant may be abandoned. This is a favorite
defense of transgressors who seek to destroy or terminate re-
strictions. The equitable right to enforce them may be lost by a
degree of acquiescence in their violations amounting to an aban-
donment of the right of enforcement.8 7  If in a general or neigh-
borhood scheme, the parties in interest, by express acts or passive
acquiescence, permit such violations of the plan or scheme as de-
stroy, wholly o' partially, the benefit from it, they absolve each
other, to a corresponding extent, from its burdens. 8 It is the
mutual benefit accruing to all and to each which makes it inequi-
table for any one so benefited to repudiate the burden, to the in-
jury of the others.8 9
How many violations of restrictions will operate as an aban-
donment? The inquiry in each case evidently is largely an isolated
one. It has been held that several violations of a covenant, which
in no substantial way affected the value and worth of the prop-
erty, were no indication of the abandonment of a general scheme
of land improvement. 0 A few violations of a restrictive cove-
nant has often been held to be no bar to injunctive relief. 91 In-
deed, a small number of violations in a large scheme of develop-
ment has been regarded as indicative of a general adherence to
the plan.92
On the other hand, a covenantee may not enforce in equity a
restrictive covenant in a general land improvement scheme, after
he has failed to exercise the right for a considerable time, and
many buildings have been erected contrary to the provisions of
the covenant. The covenantee's remedy is then limited to an
action at law.9 3 Moreover, an injunction will not be issued to a
I Chelsea Land & Imp. Co. v. Adams, 71 N. J. Eq. 771, 66 At. i8o (x9o6) ;
Fort v. Field, i24 At. 314 (N. J. Eq. 1923); Bowen v. Whilldin, 98 N. J. Eq.
140, 13o At. 1 (1925) ; Bowen v. Smith, supra note 49.
See Sanford v. Keer, 8o N. J. Eq. 24o, 244, 83 At. 225, 27 (1912).
See Sanford v. Keer, supra note 88, at 244, 83 At. at 227.
o Newbery v. Barkalow, supra note i8; Barton v. Slifer, sapra note 54.
Polhernus v. DeLisle, mipra note 54.
'= See Polhemus v. DeLisle, supra note 54, at 27i, 13o At. at 624.
Ocean City Ass'n v. Schurck, 57 N. J. Eq. 268, 41 At. 914 (1898) ; Ocean
City Ass'n v. Headley, supra note 59; Ocean City Land Co. v. Weber, 83 N. J.
Eq. 476, 91 At!. 6oo, aff'd, 84 N. J. Eq. 505, 94 Atl. 1102 (1915); Roper v. Wil-
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grantor to restrain the violation of a covenant against doing busi-
ness on Sunday, when it has been openly violated for several years
by the defendant grantee and by other grantees of the same
grantor.
9 4
In abandoning restrictions, several questions arise: First,
what action by the original owner of lots will have the effect of an
abandonment? If he knowingly permits some of the grantees to
violate the restrictions, which are intended to conserve the gen-
eral purpose of the scheme, he cannot enforce them against one
grantee." The building of a few bay windows over the line does
not work an abandonment. 6 In one of the cases, the complainant
and his predecessor owned lots on which there was a restrictive
building line. The restriction was incorporated in the deeds of
more than one hundred and fifty purchasers, one hundred of whom
had violated it. No action was taken to enforce the restriction,
save on a single occasion. It was held that the plan had been
abandoned and could not be enforced. Said Vice-Chancellor
Bergen:
"I think that all persons occupying these lands are en-
titled to be treated alike, and this complainant company can-
not undertake to waive violations of these restrictions in so
universal a manner as it is proved has been done here, and
then undertake to enforce it against one other of their pur-
chasers. Such a general consent to the non-observance of
restrictive covenants amounts to an abandonment of the
original intention and design with regard to restrictions." 97
Again, when a plan of restrictions has been so changed by alter-
ing them in subsequent deeds, for lots similarly located, that the
enforcement of the original restrictions would be a burden on
the restricted lots, without conferring any appreciable benefit on
liams, i Turn. & Russ. i8 (Eng. 1822); Peek v. Matthews, L. R. 3 Eq. 515
(1867) ; cf. Woodbine Land & Imp. Co. v. Riener, 72 N. J. Eq. 787, 65 Atl. 1004
(907).
I Ocean City Ass'n v. Chalfont, 65 N. J. Eq. 156, 55 Atl. 8oi (i9o3) ; Ocean
City Ass'n v. Schurck, su1 ra note 93.
O Chelsea Land & Imp. Co. v. Adams, supra note 87.
9'Morrow v. Hasselman, snpra note 54.
7 Chelsea Land & Imp. Co. v. Adams, supra note 87, at 773, 66 AtI. at i8I.
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the lots of those seeking to enforce them, equity will decline to
act.
On the other hand, if some of the grantees violate them with-
out the grantor's knowledge, his right to enforce the restrictions
is not lost. The effect of his conduct with respect to the known
or unknown violation of them can hardly be determined by prece-
dent, but rather by inquiry whenever the question arises. This
much is doubtless true, that:
"Where the restrictions are not universal, or after fre-
quent violation of the restrictions have been permitted, then
the neighborhood scheme will be considered abandoned." 91
The second question is: What action by the grantees may
work an abandonment of the scheme? Evidently one owner of
lots cannot accomplish this purpose. How many must conspire
to effect this end? In other words, can such a scheme be disrupted
by the action of any number of the lot owners less than all of
them; and if so, how many, by their combined action, whether
acting in concert or individually, can do it? Surely the original
owner of a land improvement scheme cannot abandon or release
any restrictions he may have imposed for the benefit of all sub-
sequent purchasers of lots, without their acquiescence. 0  Clearly,
a complainant is not estopped from opposing the erection of a
garage that is within a restriction, because other lot owners in
the vicinity, subject to the same restriction, violated their cove-
nant.10 Thus A was a resident in a land scheme which prohibited
flat roofs on any buildings. Notwithstanding the restriction,
many of them had flat roofs, and A knew of the restriction. Its
violation by others did not justify A in violating it, and as the
complainant acted promptly, A was required to comply with the
restriction."' 1
It may be difficult in some cases to decide whether there has
been a known and wilful violation of a restrictive covenant, or
'Scull v. Eilenberg, 94 N. J. Eq. 759, 763, i21 Atl. 788, 79o (9z3) ; see
Laverack v. Allen, 13o At!. 615, 616 (N. J. Eq. 1924).
,o Barton v. Slifer, supra note 54.
" Kumble v. Jaffee, ioo N. J. Eq. 29o, 134 Atl. 673 (1926).
'Durham Essex Corp. v. Schaffer, 99 N. J. Eq. 6o2, 133 At. 754 (1926).
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simply an innocent mistake. In the latter case, damages are re-
garded as an adequate compensation for the wrong, and a man-
datory injunction will not be granted."0 2 Again, if the benefits
of restrictions on lots forming a land improvement scheme are
partly or totally destroyed by violation of the plan or restrictions,
the accompanying burden is correspondingly modified. 0 3  How-
ever, when changes do not conflict with the essential purpose of
the plan and covenants, the benefit is unimpaired, and a violation
of the restrictions will be enjoined..
0 4
A restrictive covenant outside a general land scheme will
not be enforced when the grantor himself has manifested a dis-
regard of its provisions, and intends to abandon it.'0 5 Thus the
Duke of Bedford, after imposing restrictions on the use of land
sold by him, violated the spirit and intent of his covenant by
erecting a greenhouse and dwelling on the land retained. Lord
Eldon would not enforce the covenant against the other party,
after such a plain violation of its spirit and intent by the Duke
himself. 10 6
An abandonment may be effected by such a change in the
condition of the neighborhood, after the adoption of the scheme,
that its original purpose can no longer be continued. 0 7 The well
known Thacher case is perhaps the pioneer in establishing this
rule.'0 8  A change in the use of a part of the land which is sub-
ject to restrictions does not have the effect of destroying them
on the remainder. 10 9
A covenanting party, to be bound by restrictions, must have
notice of them. When he has such notice, he cannot avoid their
'Bauby v. Krasow, io7 Conn. 109, 139 At. 5o8, 57 A. L. R. 331 (1927).
Roper v. Williams; Peek v. Matthews, both supra note 93.
'°4Trout v. Lucas, supra note 54; Ocean City Ass'n v. Headley, supra note
59; Sanford v. Keer, supra note 88.
1 Page v. Murray, 46 N. J. Eq. 325, 19 At. ii (I89O).
1 0 Duke of Bedford v. Trustees of British Museum, 2 Myl. & K. 552 (1822).
'Fisher v. Griffith Realty Co., 88 N. J. Eq. 204, xoi Atl. 411 (1917) ; Page
v. Murray, supra note xo5; Starkey v. Gardner, 194 N. C. 74, 138 S. E. 408, 54
A. L. R. 8o6 (i927); cf. Sandusky v. Allsop, 99 N. J. Eq. 61, 13i At. 633
(1926).
"Trustees of Columbia College v. Thacher, 87 N. Y. 311 (1882).
' Landell v. Hamilton, 175 Pa. 327, 34 At. 663 (1896) ; Phillips v. Donald-
son, 269 Pa. 244, 12 At. 236 (i92o).
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proper effect." ° The notice may be sufficient though contained
in an unrecorded deed."' The record of a deed, containing a
restrictive building covenant, is notice to all persons to whom
the grantee's title subsequently passes." 2  By statute, a recorded
deed is a complete notice of its execution and contents to all sub-
sequent purchasers." 3 The vendor of a lot who takes advantage
of the vendee, by intentionally keeping him in ignorance of a re-
striction against erecting an apartment house, is rightfully denied
specific performance of the sale." 4
A violator of a restriction cannot afterward be rescued from
his wrongdoing by the action of his accommodating grantor in
giving him another deed modifying the first and which, if valid,
would relieve him. Such belated action is ineffective to undo the
wrong."' In Polhemus v. De Lisle 116 the court declared that
the common grantor of lots, subject to a restrictive covenant, was
without the least shred of authority or right to release or modify
the covenant so far as it operated to confer a benefit on land which
he had previously conveyed, or, by his own interpretation, to
modify the plain meaning of the restrictive covenant imposed upon
all lots in the tract.
Another defense, when all others fail, is that the complain-
ant has been sleeping on his right. This, in most cases, has very
little merit,l11 although on a few occasions the complainant has
acted too late."" Action must be taken before the violator has
I°DeRossett v. Bianchi, ioo N. J. Eq. 439, 136 Atl. 3oi (1927).
"'Wahl v. Stoy, 72 N. J. Eq. 607, 66 Adt. 176 (1907).
'Bowen v. Smith, supra note 49; Hayes v. Waverly & P. 'R. R-, supro
note 49.
1 N. J. ComP. STAT. (igio) p. 1552, § 53.
Muller v. Weiss, 9i N. J. Eq. 29, io8 Ad. 768, aff'd, 91 N. J. Eq. 321, lo9
Ad. 357 (1920).
2 Laverack v. Allen, supra note 98; Wahl v. Stoy, supra note iii.
m Supra note 54, at 268, 13o At. at 623.
Lignot v. Jaelde, 72 N. J. Eq. 233, 65 Ad. 221 (19o6) ; Heyniger v. Levin-
sohn, 87 N. J. Eq. 471, 1o1 At. i8, aff'd, 88 N. J. Eq. 34i, 102 At. 631 (1917) ;
Lamonte v. Orlando, 97 N. J. Eq. 425, 129 Ad. 44z (1925); Goater v. Ely,
.supra note 8o.
I DeGamna v. D'Aquila, xoi At. 1o28 (N. J. Eq. 1917) ; Trout v. Lucas.
supra note 54.
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expended much money. 119 The complainant must not knowingly
permit large expenditures and remain silent, especially after many
buildings have been erected contrary to the provisions of the cov-
enant.120  He must act promptly.' 2' Since owners are entitled to
the benefit of restrictions at the time of their violation, they may
apply for relief, but their grantees may be barred by acquiescence
in the violation, or by delay in enforcing their rights. An unex-
plained delay for several years is fatal. 22
The right to enforce a building restriction, incorporated in
all the deeds given by the owners of a general land improvement
scheme, enures to all grantees as members of a class, and they
may unite in an action to enjoin a breach of the covenant by other
grantees.' 2 3  An action at law for damages for the breach of a
restrictive covenant must be brought against the wrongdoer, and
may not be brought against his grantee.
1 24
We will now review the various violations of restrictions con-
tained in covenants. The most common violation is the exten-
sion of the foundations of buildings, especially homes, beyond
the restricted lines. When a general intention is shown by the
owners of land to observe and keep a covenant of this nature alive,
equity will enforce the restriction. 25 Sometimes the invasion
has been very slight, and unintentional; 126 in most cases, how-
ever, the invasion has been clearly intended.' 2 7  In both cases
Smith v. Spencer, 8i N. J. Eq. 389, 87 At. 158 (1913) ; Winslow v. New-
comb, 87 N. . Eq-. 480, ioo Atl. 613 (1917) ; O'Connell v. Holton, 91 N. J. Eq.
4, io7 Aft. 37 (1919).
Sumner v. Seaton, 47 N. J. Eq. io3, ig At!. 884 (i8go) (reviewing many
cases) ; Bridgewater v. Ocean City Ass'n, 85 N. 3. Eq. 379, 96 Aft. go5, aff'd,
88 N. J. Eq. 351, io2 At1. 1052 (917) ; Trout v. Lucas, supra note 53.
' Zelman v. Kaufheer, 76 N. J. 52, 73 At!. io48 (igog) ; Meaney v. Stork,
8o N. J. Eq. 6o, 83 At!. 492 (191) ; Leaver v. Gorman, suPra note 53.
Trout v. Lucas, supra note 54.
Henderson v. Champion, supra note 86; cf. Marselis v. Morris Canal Co.,
i N. J. Eq. 31 (1830).
' Zelman v. Kaufheer, supra note 121.
Heyniger v. Levinsohn, supra note 117.
'Wahl v. Stoy, supra note iii.
' Winfield v. Henning, s-upra note 30; Ross v. Duffy, 92 N. J. Eq. 318, 112
At!. 485 (1921) ; Brigham v. Mulock Co., s=pra note 18; Loudenslager v. Pacific
Imp. Co., 93 N. J. Eq. 218, iI5 At. 752 (I92i); Kumble v. Jaffee, supra note
ioo; Clough v. Mesnick, 96 N. J. Eq. 482, 126 At!. 74o (1924) ; Bowen v. Smith,
si pra note 49.
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injunctions have issued. The erection of bay windows,1
28
porches,129 overhanging eaves,130 and other similar extensions,
has not escaped condemnation simply because they were minor
additions.' 3 ' The violation in intent has just as clearly appeared
in them as in more conspicuous additions. If a covenant pre-
scribes that a house shall be built a specified distance from the
street, equity will charge the conscience of the grantee with the
agreement, although it neither creates an easement nor runs with
the land. 132  If a grantee claims that his deliberate disregard of a
building restriction does not damage the grantor, he must clearly
prove it.'
3 3
A common restriction is the limitation to a single residence
on a lot,1 34 although sometimes a garage is included. 1 35  This is
violated by erecting a double house; 136 or a flat-roof house
adapted for the separate residence of several families; 137 or the
use of a private dwelling house or part of a house for a boarding
house, hotel, club,13s or store.' 39 The violation is made still
" Supplee v. Cohen, so N. J. Eq. 83, 83 AtI. 373 (912) ; Strauss v. Lauden-
slager, 96 N. J. Eq. 678, 127 At. 22 (i94); Wahl v. Stoy, suipr note iII.
'Ocean City Land Co. v. Weber, supra note 93; Buck v. Adams, 45 N. J.
Eq. 552, 17 At!. 961 (1889) ; Newbery v. Barkalow, supra note i8; cf. Marsh v.
Marsh, go N. J. Eq. 244, io6 At. 8Io, reVg, 89 N. J. Eq. nio, IO4 At. 373
(1918).
o Meaney v. Stork, supro note So; Supplee v. Cohen, supra note 128.
m Righter v. Winters, 68 N. J. Eq. 252, 59 Atl. 77o (19o4). But cf. Meaney
v. Stork, supra note So. See Note (1928) 55 A. L. R. 332.
Kirkpatrick v. Peshine, supra note 49.
Lignot v. Jaekle, supra note 117.
'Rothholz v. Stern, 97 N. J. Eq. i89, 127 At!. 97 (I924). As to what
constitutes a private residence, see Hutchinson v. Ulrich, 145 Ill. 336, 341, 34
N. E. 556, 557 (1893) ; Gillis v. Bailey, 21 N. H. 149, 155 (i85o).
' Trainer v. Calef, supra note 78; Kumble v. Jaffee, supra note IOO.
a"Koch v. Gorruflo, 77 N. J. Eq. 172, 75 At. 767 (igio) ; Shoyer v. Mer-
melstein, 93 N. J. Eq. 57, 114 At!. 788 (igi); Brigham v. Mulock Co., supra
note is; cf. Underwood v..Herman & Co., spra note 81.
Skillman v. Smatheurst, 57 N. J. Eq. 1, 4o At!. 855 (1898).
z Bridgewater v. Ocean City R. R., supra note 63; Lignot v. Jaekle, supra
note 117; Trainor v. LeBeck, 99 N. J. Eq. 673, 134 At!. 355 (1926), rev'd, 139
At!. I6 (1927) ; Schreiber v. Drosnes, ioo N. J. Eq. 591, 135 At1. 92o, 136 At!.
515 (1926).
A covenant in a lease that the premises shall be used only for a saloon is
not violated by not using them at all. McCormick v. Stephany, 57 N. J. Eq.
257,41 At!. 840 (189).
'Cornish v. Wiessman, 56 N. 3. Eq. 61o, 35 At!. 408 (i898); Dettsloff v.
Hockstetter, 96 N. J. Eq. 391, 124 At. 770 (1924).
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greater by erecting more than one house on a single lot; 140 but
a covenant providing that the grantee shall not erect any building
known as a tenement or community house is not violated by
erecting a two-family house, each family occupying a single
floor.' 4"  In Jones v. Mulligan, 4 2 it was held that a restriction,
that no building "except for cottage residence purposes" should
be erected, did not prohibit the erection of a two-family house, as
a cottage was a dwelling house and was not limited to a structure
for the use of only one family.
The courts are unable to agree on a definition of a private
residence, within the usual restriction of covenantors that only a
single private residential house shall be erected on a lot. In Koch
v. Gorruflo,'43 the court held that a two-family house is not a
private residence, but a collection of apartments, saying that if a
covenant against anything but a private residence did not prohibit
two families, a family might be put in each room and the claim
still be made that the building was occupied as a private residence.
This, however, represents but one view, for although the cases are
rapidly multiplying the decisions in the various jurisdictions show
no tendency toward harmony."44
A covenant which excludes factories is violated by erecting
a light station; 14' but a restrictive covenant against a livery
or sales stable does not include a public garage."4  Nor is the
garage a nuisance per se.14 7  It may, however, become one
by the mode of using it.' 48  Moreover, a restriction prohibiting
the erection of a stable within a specified distance from a street
does not apply to a garage.'4 9
" Holman v. Parker, supra note 8o.
"Miller v. Cavanaugh, 94 N. J. Eq. 619, 121 At. 339 (U923).
1 121 Atl. 6o8 (N. J. Eq. 1923).
" Supra note 136.
2" See Note (I922) i8 A. L. R. 451; Note (1928) 57 A. L. R. 244.
Scrymser v. Seabright Electric Co., 74 N. J. Eq. 587, 70 At. 977 (1908).
'Bourgeois v. Miller, 89 N. J. Eq. 285, io4 At. 383 (1918).
'Diocese of Trenton v. Toman, 74 N. J. Eq. 702, 70 At. 6o6 (igO8).
' O'Hara v. Nelson, 71 N. J. Eq. I6i, 63 At. 836 (igo6). As to what con-
stitutes a nuisance, see Note (I2) 5o A. L R. io7.
"Riverbank Imp. Co. v. Bancroft, 209 Mass. 217, 95 N. E. 216, 34 L R. A.
(N. s.) 73o (191I); Hilsinger v. Schwartz, 99 N. J. Eq. 288, 133 At!. 184
(1926).
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Elsewhere it has been held that a public garage is not a nui-
sance per se like a glue factory. A lawful business is never a
nuisance so long as it is carried on reasonably and with due re-
gard to the health and peace of others.15° Moreover, there is a
distinction between a public nuisance, which is common to all
the members of the public, and a private nuisance, which affects
only one, or a small number.151
Two other kinds of restrictions have come before the courts
for construction and enforcement. One of them relates to the
sale of liquors. Violators have been persistent in disregarding a
covenant of this nature, even when it has been clearly expressed.
152
The restriction in one of the cases applied to a hotel. The de-
fense was that a house dispensing drinks to a patron seated at
a table, to which the public had no access, could not be regarded
as a public drinking house. On this view Vice-Chancellor Learning
thus commented:
"The distinctive feature urged is that the drinker must
sit and drink at a table and is not permitted to enter the
room from which the drinks are served. Whether the pub-
lic will drink less when required to sit in a room removed
from the inspiring glitter of a bar does not appear; yet that
seems to me to be the only element that can be regarded as
a substantial distinguishing feature of the two situations." 153
The absence of bar glitter at the place of consumption was re-
garded as not enough to take the hotel out of the category of
a public drinking house.
Another common covenant is that the grantor will not ob-
struct the view of the grantee over the remaining lands of the
grantor. This is often important and valuable to the grantee. A
grantor in selling land for a particular purpose cannot derogate
from his grant by so using his other land as to impair or inter-
fere with that purpose. 154 The construction of a pavilion by the
SRhodes v. Dunbar, 57 Pa. 274 (1868).
' Phillips v. Donaldson, 269 Pa. 244, I2 Adl. z36 (192o).
Woodbine Land & Imp. Co. v. Riener, 72 N. J. Eq. 787, 65 Ad. ioo4
0907).
' Griscom v. Barcelonne, go N. J. Eq. 369, 372, io7 Atl. 587, 588 (9g9).
'5 Buck v. Adams, supra note 132.
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grantor on his land may clearly be a violation of his covenant.Y5
The rule has been thus stated in a broader way: When a grantor
restricts the enjoyment of a portion of the land conveyed for the
benefit of the portion retained, the restriction, if reasonable and
consonant with public policy, may be enforced in equity against
the grantee at the instance of the grantor.'5 6 Moreover, this
restriction is not rendered ineffective by the action of some vio-
lators. Thus, over one hundred violations of a restriction, for
the preservation of a view to lot owners, has been held not to de-
feat the right of one of the owners to enforce the restriction
against another who attempted to build a structure that would
interfere with the lot owner's free and unobstructed vision.
15 7
Ibid.
Hayes v. Waverly & P. R. R., supra note 49; Goater v. Ely, supra note
8o; Cornish v. Wiessman, supra note i44; Roberts v. Scull, 58 N. J. Eq. 396,
43 At. 583 (1899).
'MPearson v. Stafford, 88 N. J. Eq. 385, io2 Atl. 836 (1918).
